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FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO FREE
PRESS
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
INTRODUCTION
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,' the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve two troublesome issues in the
law of search and seizure. The Court balanced first
amendment 2 and fourth amendment 3 interests in
determining the constitutionality of the search of
a newspaper office for evidence of a crime not
committed by members of the newspaper's staff.
The Court held that the media enjoy no special
first amendment exemption from "reasonable"
searches and seizures.4 However, first amendment
implications were to trigger a more careful scrutiny
of the reasonableness of a search warrant, which
has been defined as a written order issued by a
magistrate directing a peace officer to search a
premises for personal property and directing that
the property be brought before him.
5
The Court also found that the fourth amend-
ment permitted law enforcement authorities to
obtain a search warrant when they believed that
evidence pertaining to a crime was in the possession
of some innocent third party. Those authorities
were not required to demonstrate first the imprac-
' 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978).
2 U.S. CONSrT. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.
3 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
498 S. Ct. at 1981-82.
The first such recorded search did not occur until
1971, and there had been only a total of six (in California)
since that time (as of 1976). Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media: A Statutory, Fourth and First Amendment Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REv. 957, 957, 962 (1976). Given the present
trend of press resistance to subpoenas, id. at 958, however,
the scarcity of media searches is likely to evaporate in the
wake of the Court's decision.
5 BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1175 (1930) (2d ed.
1948).
ticability of gathering that evidence by subpoena
duces tecum 6 (which is a court order requiring a
witness to appear before the court and to bring
with him whatever evidence is described in the
order).7 In Zurcher, a crucial fifth-vote concurring
opinion concluded that press or third party status
should play some role in determining the reasona-
bleness of a warrant request. However, what that
role is to be was left undefined.8
FACTS AND DIsTrCT COURT INTERPRETATION
On Friday, April 9, 1971, officers of the Palo
Alto Police Department and the Santa Clara
County Sheriffs Office were called to the scene of
a large demonstration at the Stanford University
Hospital. The protestors had occupied the facility's
administrative offices and had barricaded them-
selves inside. The police unsuccessfully attempted
to persuade the demonstrators to leave. In an
ensuing clash between protestors and police at the
east side of the building, nine officers were injured,
some seriously, and the hospital area was severely
damaged. Most of the bystanders and reporters
had been at the west side entrance. The injured
policemen could identify only two of their assail-
ants, although one officer did notice someone pho-
tographing the incident.
The following Sunday, the student-run Stanford
Daily published a special edition on the protest,
containing articles and photographs indicating
that a staff member had been taking pictures at
the scene. The next day, the Santa Clara County
District Attorney's Office obtained a warrant from
the municipal court to make an immediate search
of the newspaper's offices for negatives, film and
pictures depicting the occurrences at the hospital.
The warrant was issued on a finding of probable
cause that the film could lead to the identification
698 S. Ct. at 1975-76. This is also a subject heretofore
largely unlitigated, as evidenced by the district court's
admissions, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124,
127-28 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and lack of precedent. Id at
128.
7 BALLANTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 1244 (2d ed. 1948).
8 98 S. Ct. at 1983-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of the persons who had injured the police officers.
The warrant affidavit did not allege that any
member of the Daily's staff was implicated in the
unlawful activities.
Pursuant to the warrant, four members of the
Palo Alto Police Department conducted a search
of the newspaper's offices later that same day. The
search lasted approximately fifteen minutes, yet it
was quite thorough. The Daily's photographic lab-
oratories, filing cabinets, desks and wastebaskets
were examined. Although locked drawers were not
searched, the officers apparently did have the op-
portunity to read confidential notes and corre-
spondence; whether or not they did so was disputed
but was never resolved.9 Apparently, only those
photographs that had already been published in
the April 11 issue were found and no materials
were removed from the Daily's offices.
Approximately one month later, the Daily and
members of its staff brought a civil action in the
United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, seeking both declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.0 The
named defendants were the police officers who had
conducted the search, the Chief of Police, the
District Attorney and one of his deputies, and the
judge who had issued the warrant. The suit alleged
that the defendants, under the color of state law,
had deprived the plantiffs of their rights under the
first, fourth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.
The District Court granted the plantiffs' motion
for declaratory relief," ruling that the issuance of
a warrant against an innocent third party, and
search pursuant thereto, without a prior demon-
stration that a subpoena duces tecum would be an
impractical means of gathering the desired evi-
dence, was "per se" unreasonable and hence a
violation of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The court added that failure to honor such
a subpoena would not constitute sufficient grounds
'I at 1924 n.2.
'o42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, ofany State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
for a warrant; it would have to be demonstrated
that the possessor of the sought-after objects in-
tended to disregard a court order not to move or
destroy them.12 The court then held that because
of first amendment considerations, whenever the
innocent third party was a newspaper, searches
would be tolerated "only in the rare circumstance
where there is a clear showing that (1) important
materials will be destroyed or removed from the
jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be
futile.'
3
The district court's opinion established for the
fourth amendment the "less drastic means" test for
third party searches. This test required that, when
there is a conflict between a fundamental individ-
ual right and some legitimate governmental inter-
est, the government may further its interest by
using only those means which would be least intru-
sive on the individual right. The "less drastic
means" doctrine had been used in other areas of
constitutional law, but had never been used in
connection with the fourth amendment.14 In this
case, the threatened individual interest was the
third person's right to privacy, or, cast in fourth
amendment terms, to security from "unreasonable
searches and seizures"; the legitimate governmen-
tal aim was the gathering of criminal evidence, to
enforce the law and further justice. The least dras-
tic means of harmonizing them was, according to
the court, via the subpoena duces tecum; the state
would receive its evidence, and the invasion of
privacy would minimized.
The court advanced four reasons for incorporat-
ing the "less drastic means" test into the fourth
amendment. First, it found that our society places
tremendous value upon privacy, as evidenced by
the fourth amendment itself. This, the court be-
lieved, was so well established that it needed little
support.iS Second, it noted that search warrants
traditionally have been used only against those
actually suspected of a crime. 6 Third, the court
12 Id at 133.
13 Id at 135 (original emphasis).
"The doctrine has been used predominantly in the
area of the first amendment, though it originated in
applications of the commerce clause. It has also been
used to support the right to privacy', and the right to
travel. 86 Hxv. L Rav. 1317, 1322, 1322 n.30 (1973),
and cases cited therein; 78 YALE L. J. 464,464 n.4 (1969),
and cases cited therein.
15353 F. Supp. at 130-31.
rd at 131. The authorities cited for this proposition,
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); United
States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930); and
Kaplan, Search and Seizure. A No-Man's Land in Criminal
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said that the subpoena requirement was necessary
to protect the privacy of third parties, since the
chief remedy for an unlawful search and seizure is
suppression of the illegally gained evidence, and
that remedy would not help a non-defendant. This
would create the anomalous situation in which the
accused would have far greater protection than an
innocent party, and the police would have no
deterrent to illegal searches of third persons. 17 The
court's final line of reasoning was based on an
analogy to Bacon v. United States.'8 In that case an
arrest warrant for a material witness was invali-
dated because of a failure to show probable cause
that the witness could not be secured by sub-
poena.' 9 Though that ruling relied on statutory
grounds,20 the Bacon court concluded that it was
ultimately based on fourth amendment dictates.
Therefore, if an arrest warrant for an innocent
third party required a prior showing of the im-
practicality of obtaining a subpoena, the search
warrant directed at an innocent third party should
demand the same showing.
2
'
In considering the countervailing first amend-
ment interest in a free press, the district court
examined several obscenity cases demonstrating
the special effect of the amendment on the govern-
ment's general criminal process, and on searches
and seizures in particular.Y The court indicated
Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 475-77 (1961), do not really
support it. They do explain that the fourth amendment
was aimed primarily at the practice of using general
warrants to ransack a man's home in hopes of finding
some evidence of criminal activity to use against him.
But this is a long way from saying that third parties were
not to be searched. The Court does find two of three state
cases cited by the plaintiffs to be supportive of the
principle, Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45
(Sup. Ct. 1923); Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132
(1914), but see note 40 infra and accompanying text.
17 353 F. Supp. at 131-32.
18 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
'9Id. at 943.
20 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970).
2 353 F. Supp. at 128-29, 132.
2 Id. at 134. The cases cited were A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729-32 (1961); Denich, Inc. v.
Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 401 U.S. 990 (1971); Bethview
Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (all involving the
seizure, per warrant, of allegedly obscene materials). See
also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (in-
volving a state law requiring the disclosure of NAACP
membership lists and freedom of association implica-
tions). Justice White, 98 S. Ct. at 1981-82, was quick to
accept these cases, and even listed additional ones,
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1973) (dis-
that when the object of a warrant was possibly
protected by the constitution, special safeguards
were needed. In the obscenity cases, a prior adver-
sarial hearing was found to be necessary; in this
case, the subpoena-first requirement, with its pos-
sibility of motion to quash, was considered the
appropriate safeguard. 2a
The lower court also cited the "less drastic
means" test in the first amendment area. It noted
that freedom of press is a fundamental right24 and
then outlined several ways in which indiscriminate
searches of newspapers could hamper that freedom:
1) Police, in executing the warrant, would be in a
position to see notes and photographs not men-
tioned in the warrant. This would render all con-
fidential materials vulnerable, causing sources to
dry up; 2) Unlike a subpoena, the issuance of a
warrant would provide the newspaper with no
judicial control over what happens and what in-
formation is discovered; 3) Searches would jeop-
ardize the newspaper's credibility and create the
risk of self-censorship.25 Considering the fundamen-
tal right of freedom of the press and the threat
thereto, the court then suggested the less drastic
means-the subpoena requirement. According to
its opinion, the chance to move that it be quashed
allowing a warrantless seizure of an allegedly porno-
graphic film); Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636,
637 (1968) (another test of the constitutionality of the
seizure, by warrant, of obscene material); Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482, 485 (1965) (warrant seizure of
communist material); but according to him they did not
stand for the propositioris attributed to them by the
district court. See text at notes 30-31 infra.
23 353 F. Supp. at 134.
24 Id. at 133. The district court is correct in its assump-
tion. Freedom of the press is among the fundamental
rights protected by the first amendment. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1973); West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 62 (1943). The fun-
damentality of various aspects of press freedom have
received specific recognition. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (gathering information); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (prior
restraint of publication); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936) (distributing).
25 353 F. Supp. at 134-35. Justice White, in the Su-
preme Court opinion, listed other factors in addition to
those listed by the district court: 1) Searches will be
physically disruptive to the point of impeding timely
publication; 2) The processing and dissemination of
news will be chilled by the prospects that searches will
disclose internal editorial deliberations and other infor-
mation of potential interest to the police; 3) Reporters
will be deterred from recording and preserving their
recollections for future use. 98 S. Ct. at 1981. Justice




would somewhat accommodate the first amend-
ment interests and the competing fundamental
government concern in enforcing the criminal
law.?
The defendants appealed the decision and the
court of appeals affirmed, adopting the district
court's opinion per curiam. 7 The United States
Supreme Court accepted the petition for writ of
certiorari,28 and reversed on both issues. Mr. Justice
White announced the judgment of the Court, and
delivered an opinion joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice
Powell concurred for the fifth vote.
SUPREME COURT's VIEWPOINT
The effect of the first amendment on the reason-
ableness requirement for fourth amendment
searches and seizures was perhaps the most impor-
tant issue in Zurcher. Justice White's plurality opin-
ion rejected the district court's reasoning. News-
papers, he said, did not qualify for an exemption
from otherwise "reasonable" searches merely be-
cause they were newspapers.29 White did recognize
that the first amendment has some effect on deter-
mining the reasonableness of the search under the
fourth?30 But he found that when first amendment
interests were involved, there must only be a careful
appraisal of the situation by a check of the warrant
requirements with "scrupulous exactitude." Noth-
ing more was mandated.3 ' White stated that the
framers of the Bill of Rights did not create a ban
on newspaper warrants and searches; nor did they
require preliminary showings that subpoenas
would be impractical or that some member of the
press itself would be implicated before a news
facility be searched. A warrant need only satisfy
the following preconditions: probable cause, spec-
ificity with respect to the space to be searched and
the things to be seized, and overall reasonablenees.
According to White, as long as the warrant is
properly carried into effect, is policed and observed,
and leaves no area open to discretion, there will be
little danger of abuse.
a2
The district court had found that, since the
fundamental right of freedom of the press was
26 353 F. Supp. at 133-34.
27550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
2s434 U.S. 816 (1977).
2998 S. Ct. at 1981-82.
a See text at notes 22-23 supra.
3 98 S. Ct. at 1981 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
32 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
jeopardized, the state had to secure its evidence in
a manner that was less threatening to that right.
This "less drastic means" argument was discounted
by the Supreme Court on two levels. First, White
rejected the contention that searches of newsrooms
threaten media freedom, because he found no em-
pirical evidence to support that conclusion.3 3 Sec-
ond, he found that even if the rights of the press
were in jeopardy, the subpoena was not necessarily
appropriate or less intrusive. This was so, he said,
because if there was enough probable cause' to
support a warrant, then the subpoena would also
be justified and would withstand any motion to
quash.? Thus, since the newspaper would have to
turn over the evidence in either event, neither
method would protect press freedom any better
than the other.
The Court also rejected the claim that the search
of the Daily constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint of publication. '2 Justice White, citing Hel-
ler v. New York,32 stated that not every search or
seizure-in fact not even most of them-consti-
tuted a prior restraint. He went on to conclude
that the facts surrounding the search of the Daily
were within the no restraint category. 7
The plurality similarly rejected the contention
that the fourth amendment required an applica-
tion of the "less drastic means" test to third party
searches. Justice White found that this formulation
would constitute a "sweeping revision of the Fourth
Amendment,"' with no justification from either a
facial reading of the amendment or precedent."
The state cases cited by the district court were
dismissed in a footnote as not supportive of the
33 Id at 1982. The Court cited Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972), which held that a reporter's claim
of a privilege to protect news source confidentiality was
not included in the first or fourteenth amendments. In
Branzburg, Justice White, in writing for another plurality
(Justice Powell again concurring for the needed fifth
vote), recognized the possibility that news sources might
dry up, but refused to base his decision upon that possi-
bility absent concrete proof. He believed instead that
publicity-starved informants, lenient prosecutors, and po-
lice protection would keep the system intact. 408 U.S. at
693-95.
34 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
35 Prior restraints are unconstitutional, except in very
limited circumstances. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S.
175(1968). The prior restraint argument was not men-
tioned in the district court opinion.
w 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (involving a warrant seizure of
obscene material).
a798 S. Ct. at 1982.
3sId at 1975.
3 2 ld. at 1975-76.
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court's position,40 and the analogy to Bacon v. United
States4 was characterized as "unpersuasive with
respect to the search for criminal evidence."4 2 Re-
jecting any notion of special treatment for third
parties, White further disagreed with the apparent
view of the district court that the reasonableness,
and hence the constitutionality, of a search warrant
depended partly on the culpability of the person
against whom it was directed. White found that
the critical element in a search reasonable under
the fourth amendment was not the guilt or inno-
cence of the owner or possessor of what was being
sought, since that had no bearing on the state's
interest in recovering evidence. Rather, White
found the crucial consideration to be the presence
or absence of probable cause to believe that the
objects sought were on the premises named in the
warrant. Thus, innocent parties were accorded no
special position under the fourth amendment. This
the Court saw as the mandate of the applicable
case law.4 3
Justice White was not even convinced that the
subpoena requirement would be an appropriate
"less drastic means." He found that this doctrine
requires that the alternative governmental course
serve its purposes (in this case, the effective enforce-
ment of the criminal law) at least as well as the
40 Id. at 1975-76 n.5, (citing Commodity Mfg. Co. v.
Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923)'(disallowing the
seizure of evidence as it did not belong to the person
indicted, regardless of warrant); Owens v. Way, 141 Ga.
796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914) (disallowing seizure of another's
property when the only authority was an arrest warrant
for a suspect); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65
N.W. 530 (1895) (disallowing police custody of property
to be used as evidence when it belonged to a third party);
and a fourth case, not cited in the district court's opinion,
People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N.Y.S.2d 268 (County
Ct. 1939) (which disallowed a seizure of evidence from
third parties, saying the subpoena duces tecum was the
proper method)).
41 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
4298 S. Ct. at 1975-76 n.5. The rejection of an analogy
to an arrest warrant case is sounder than this short
treatment might suggest. The Bacon rationale was based
primarily on a statutory analysis. 449 F.2d at 937-41.
And even if it is accepted that the matter ultimately rests
on fourth amendment considerations, id. at 942; Stanford
Daily, 353 F. Supp. at 129, the divergence in the values
protected and the requirements for an arrest warrant
versus a search warrant compel rejection of the corollary.
Note, Searches and Seizures: Warranted Search of Party Not
Suspected of Criminal Behavior is Unreasonable When Subpoena
Not Shown to Be Impractical, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1317,
1320-21 (1973).
4" 98 S. Ct. at 1976-78. Whatever the soundness of the
rule of law, the cases that Justice White relied on are, at
best, of questionable support. See text at notes 64-81
supra.
challenged "intrusive means." But, according to
White, it was by no means obvious that appearance
pursuant to a subpoena could adequately substi-
tute for actual searches. White reasoned that a
general subpoena-first requirement would make it
more difficult to secure authorization for a search
in those instances where one was really needed. By
making the search warrant a last resort measure,
many judges might fail to issue one even when it
was clearly necessary, e.g., when it was obvious the
materials would be destroyed if not seized. Sub-
poenas might also be delayed by motions to quash
or by fifth amendment claims, further increasing
the likelihood that the evidence would be moved
or destroyed.
White also found a problem in defining an
innocent third party. He noted that someone may
be believed to be innocent, but actually may be
implicated in the crime or may be close to someone
who is implicated in the crime; a subpoena-first
requirement would give such a person the time to
destroy the evidence.44 Moreover, most searches
were said to take place so early in an investigation
that few individuals involved would be conclu-
sively believed to be innocent. 45 Finally, White
found that even if innocent third parties were left
unprotected from illegal searches by the exclusion-
ary rule, the "less drastic means" test was not
necessary since search warrants are difficult to
obtain and would only be used when absolutely
necessary.
46
Justice Powell's brief concurring opinion pro-
vided the fifth vote to constitute a majority.47 His
opinion seemed at first to reject Justice Stewart's
dissenting theory of first amendment protections
for the press. Powell appeared to join fully in the
Court's decision and rationale," stating that the
framers did not intend to create any special media
exception to the fourth amendment. He endorsed
the careful scrutiny which the plurality had or-
dered for press warrants. 49 However, Powell went
further. Whereas the plurality had read the first
amendment as mandating a careful approach and
"98 S. Ct. at 1979-80.
4Id. 1980.
461d. at 1980. These statements are questionable in
light of the facts of the search in Zurcher: the.Daily staff
was in no way suspected, nor was there any indication
that whatever photographs had been taken were about
to be destroyed.47 Only eight votes were cast. Justice Brennan did not
take part in the case.
498 S. Ct. at 1983-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 1983-84.
[Vol. 69
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"scrupulous exactitude" in granting warrants to
search media facilities, Powell indicated that the
first amendment required something more. As he
noted: "While there is no justification for the es-
tablishment of a separate Fourth Amendment pro-
cedure for the press, a magistrate can and should
take cognizance of the independant values pro-
tected by the First Amendment-such as those
highlighted by Mr. Justice Stewart-when he
weighs such factors.
' ' s
Unlike the plurality, Powell seemed to say that
the magistrate should specifically consider the pos-
sible ramifications for freedom of press when decid-
ing whether to issue a warrant. He wanted those
ramifications to be an independant factor in weigh-
ing the reasonableness of a proposed search, instead
of merely a trigger to more careful scrutiny of the
other factors. This suggested a balance test; under
Powell's formula, there would be instances where
warrants would not issue, even if the probable
cause standard was met, because of the adverse
affect it would have on freedom of the press. This
would not be possible under the plurality's "scru-
pulous exactitude" test.
Though his main concern regarded the issuance
of warrants authorizing searches of media facilities,
Powell expressed siiilar reservations concerning
the practice of third party searches in general. In
a footnote, he said:
Similarly, the magnitude of a proposed search di-
rected at any third party, together with the nature
and significance of the material sought, are factors
properly bearing on the reasonableness and partic-
ularity requirements. Moreover, there is no reason
why police officers executing a warrant should not
seek the cooperation of the subject party in order to
prevent needless disruptionYs
This was a far cry from the district court's sub-
poena-first requirement. But it is equally clear that
here, as well as in the press search area, Powell did
not adopt the plurality's approach. He again opted
for a balancing test. When the party to be searched
is not suspected of involvement in, the crime, the
probable cause requirement is affected. The extent
to which the requirement is affected is a question
left unanswered.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, dis-
sented on the first amendment question.!2 Stewart
5Id at 1984.
5
' Id at 1984 n.2.
52 He agreed with the court that third parties in general
should not be treated differently. Mat 1984 n.1 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
maintained that his comments were based on the
first amendment alone, without consideration of
the fourth amendment.s His dissent advocated use
of the "less drastic means" analysis rejected by the
plurality. Stewart listed in some detail the ways,
discussed previously, in which a search warrant
may disrupt the freedom to publish.s4 He therefore
reasoned that some other means of gathering infor-
mation, besides the search, should be used. Noting
that the first amendment required an adversary
procedure to judge the challenge to free expres-
sion,ss Stewart concluded that the subpoena-first
requirement devised by the district court would be
an appropriate measure. The legitimate interests of
the state would be served, and the infringement on
freedom of the press would be minimized.5
The dissent of Justice Stevens addressed neither
the question of search warrants for innocent third
parties, nor the first amendment problem directly.
Unlike his fellowJustices, Stevens believed that the
real issue concerned the nature of the evidence
seized, as opposed to the identity of the person
from whom it was taken.57 Concluding that the
nature of the evidence in the possession of the Daily
prevented its legal seizure, as it was not contra-
band, criminal plunder, a weapon, or some other
instrumentality of a crime, he dissented.
Stevens stressed the historical interpretation of
the fourth amendment protections against "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures," and regulations of
the procedure for issuance of warrants. According
to his dissent, the framers of the amendment were
influenced by the famous English case of Entick v.
Carrington,s8 which had held that a warrant author-
izing seizure of private papers was illegal and
beyond the power of a magistrate to issue.59 Thus,
such seizures were considered "per se" unreasona-
ble and the warrant could not apply to them. The
personal papers prohibition eventually developt d
in American law to include anything that would
be considered "mere evidence." Only stolen goods,
contraband, weapons, or other actual instrumen-
talities of a crime were to be seized by warrant.
Any other type of evidence was obtained by meth-
ods which sought at least a degree of cooperation
"53,
" M, at 1984-85. See note 25 supr,,
'Justice Stewart makes reference to several cases. 98
S. Ct. at 1987 n.10.
Mi. at 1987.
rfdc at 1989-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
59 98 S. Ct. at 1988 n.1, citing Enlick, 19 How. St. Tr.
at 1066.
19781
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from the possessor, e.g., the subpoena duces
tecum.
60
That policy was abruptly changed in 1967 by
the United States Supreme Court in Warden v.
Hayden,61 which permitted searches for any type of
evidence. Stevens indicated that, in opening the
range of permissible searches to anyone who might
possess something relevant to the case at hand, as
opposed to just those who might have weapons,
contraband, plunder, or any other instrumentality
of the crime, the number of people subject to police
intrusion was greatly increased. This made possible
serious invasions of privacy. According to Stevens,
the prior limit on items subject to search had also
served to limit the "category of persons and the
character of privacy" that could be affected
thereby. If there was probable cause that a person
possessed plunder, weapons, contraband, or some
other instrumentality of a crime, he was probably
implicated and likely to dispose of the evidence.
Thus, a warrant and search were justified. But,
according to Stevens, with the evidence distinction
gone, the privacy of innocent people would be
invaded unnecessarily, for, unlike the possession of
the instruments of a crime, possession of mere
documentary evidence does not necessarily indicate
either complicity in the crime or a readiness to
dispose of such evidence.62 Innocent parties would
be subjected to a search when a subpoena would
have been sufficient to serve the goverment's inter-
ests.
Stevens thus appeared to find that Warden was
wrongly decided. But he indicated that even if he
were to accept the decision, a violation of the
fourth amendment still occurred here. He said that
in broadening the scope of items subject to search,
Warden had also changed the requirements of prob-
able cause, so that a showing of the necessity of an
unannounced search was mandated. Stevens found
such a showing lacking, and so condemned the
search of the Stanford Daily as unreasonable63
60 98 S. Ct. at 1988-89. The ban on searches for
evidence of a "documentary" nature is well supported by
precedent. See, e.g., Harriss v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 154 (1947); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
587 (1946); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464-65 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617-24
(1886). Indeed, the rule has even been mentioned posi-
tively in dicta in cases since Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967). Warden abolished the documentary evidence
rule. See text at notes 61-63 infra. Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 346 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 330 (1973).
6i 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
6298 S. Ct. at 1989-90.
ANALYSIS
Writing for the Zurcher plurality, White relied
primarily on his view of precedent in rejecting the
subpoena-first requirement for third party search
cases. 64 The district court, in admitting the paucity
of case law on the subject, was actually far closer
to the truth;e6 the correctness of White's reading of
the fourth amendment aside, the particular cases
he cited are not dispositive of the constitutionality
of innocent party search. White interpreted the
decisions as creating a general rule of search rea-
sonableness focusing on the object of the search,
rather than on the person subjected to it. But the
cases, United States v. Biswell,6s Colonnade Catering
Corporation v. United States,67 See v. City of Seattle,68
Camera v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San
Francisco,69 Frank v. Maryland70 Husty v. United
States,71 and Carroll v. United States,72 although they
did place primary emphasis on the object of the
search, were all exceptions to the normal require-
ments of probable cause for warrants. Each of the
opinions justified the use of unusual procedures by
stressing special circumstances, be it in the nature
of the item being regulated, as in Biswell,3 Colon-
nade7 4 Husty7 ' and Carroll; in some requirement
of administrative necessity, as in Camera,' See,78
8 Id at 1990-91. Stevens' arguments went unanswered
in any of the other opinions. For a rebuttal of sorts, see
Warden v. Hayden itself, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
6498 S. Ct. at 1975-78..
6 See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
66 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (dealing with the legality of a
warrantless search for certain types of firearms, author-
ized by § 923 (g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968).
67 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (concerning 26 U.S.C. § 7342,
making it an offense for a liquor licensee to refuse admis-
sion to a federal inspector, and in effect authorizing
warrantless searches in this area).
68 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (involving administrative
searches for health and safety violations).
69 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (dealing with administrative
inspections).
70 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (again, concerning administra-
tive searches).
7' 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (involving the warrantless
search of an automobile pursuant to the National Pro-
hibition Act).
7 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (also involving automobile
searches).
" 406 U.S. at 311 (a special congressional regulation
of certain types of firearms thought likely to be used for
illicit purposes).
74 397 U.S. at 73-74 (recognizing that liquor is a
special item and so may be carefully regulated).
75 282 U.S. at 700, 702 (also dealing with liquor's
special qualities).
76 267 U.S. at 155 (also concerning liquor).
n387 U.S. at 534-35 (recognizing that lower reason-
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and Frank;ss or in the lack of time to secure a
warrant, as in Husott and Carroll.8' As such, they
presented rules limited to particular fact situations
not 'present in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. Similarly,
none of these decisions specifically stated that the
possessor's status was irrelevant in every instance.
In refusing to require use of a "less drastic
means" analysis to determine the reasonableness,
and hence the constitutionality under the fourth
amendment of third party searches, White's anal-
ysis was more convincing. "Less drastic means"
succeeds only when the substitute procedure is as
effective in fulfilling the state's goal. According to
White, it was by no means obvious that the sub-
poena could do the job of the warrant. Indeed, the
opposite seemed to be the case. White argued that
because there is no real guarantee of the ultimate
innocence of anyone originally thought to be un-
involved, and because of the possible delays and
countering actions inherent in the subpoena proc-
ess, a protective class that encompassed everyone
not immediately suspected of a crime would lead
to the frustration of justice." The logic of this
argument seems persuasive.
Somewhat less persuasive was White's logic in
the first amendment portion of his opinion. The
questions raised by the district court and by Justice
Stewart's dissent remained effectively unanswered.
White found relevance in the fact that even though
the framers were aware of the possibilities of abuse,
they neither prohibited press searches nor man-
dated any subpoena-first process.83 But this argu-
ment is specious. When something is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the constitution this does not
mean that it is sanctioned in all its particulars. The
framers themselves recognized that as conditions
change, so must the law. It is doubtful-that they
foresaw the rise in importance of confidential news
sources, or the damage of chilling effects, but they
left the first amendment open enough to encompass
them.8
ableness standards were needed to preserve public health
and safety standards).
78 387 U.S. at 542 (also concerning reduced standards
for administrative searches).
79 359 U.S. at 366-67 (also dealing with public neces-
sity).
80 282 U.S. at 700 (where an auto thought to contain
then-considered dangerous contraband was about to es-
cape).
81 267 U.S. at 153 (also dealing with the problems
inherent in automobile searches).
82 98 S. Ct. at 1979-80.
8Id at 1981-82.
Judge J. Skelly Wright has written:
Of course, the constittition is written in broad
Nor did White provide satisfactory answers to
the issues raised concerning use of the "less drastic
means" test where first amendment implications
were present. The ways in which the freedom of
the press could be endangered, as outlined above,ss
were discounted by White as either unproved or
controllable by a strict adherence to procedural
safeguardsse Stewart, in dissent, provided an ap-
propriate reply to White's request for proof:
This... seems to me to ignore common experience.
It requires no blind leap of faith to understand that
a person who gives information to a journalist only
on the condition that his identity will not be re-
vealed will be less likely to give that information if
he knows that, despite the journalist's assurance, his
identity may in fact be disclosed. And it cannot be
denied that confidential information may be ex-
posed to the eyes of police officers who execute a
search warrant by rummaging through files, cabi-
nets, desks and wastebaskets of a newsroom. Since
the indisputable effect of such searches will thus be
to prevent a newsman from being able to promise
confidentiality to his potential sources, it seems
obvious to me that a journalist's access to informa-
tion, and thus the public's will thereby be im-
paired..7
Furthermore, if adherence to procedure was iup-
posed to minimize the dangers to a free press, it
was either not being enforced or was failing in that
goal, for both the district court and Stewart cited
numerous affidavits of newsmen, including staff
majestic language. How else should it have been
written? The framers were not so dim-witted as to
believe that times would not change, that unforseen
problems would not arise. The reason for framing
the constitution is to guarantee a general sort of
relation between government and its citizens. To
achieve that end the constitution must have a pur-
posive permanence. It must serve as a "living"
safeguard against certain sorts of excesses on the
part of elected officials misled ... by inflamed emo-
tions and calculations of immediate consequences.
It must, in short, be written in "vague" language. If
the framers had intended only to forbid coups d'etat
and clearly totalitarian measures, they could have
been far more specific.
Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Su-
preme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769, 784-85 (1971). For a
more detailed analysis of the "living constitution" theory,
see Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76
HAiv. L. REv. 673, 727-50 (1969). For an explication of
the same theory in a first amendment context, see Frantz,
Is the First Amendment Law?, 51 CAL. L. REv. 729, 738-44
(1963).
S5' See n.25 and accompanying text supra.
6 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
87 Id at 1985 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omit-
ted).
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members of the Stanford Daily, who stated that
their sources had dried up because of an inability
to -guarantee anonymity. In fact, in some cases,
these journalists were physically prevented from
covering stories for fear that the information could
end up in police hands.ss In light of those facts, it
is unclear just what White would accept as proof
of impingement on the freedom to gather and
disseminate the news.
White also refused to acknowledge that a sub-
poena could be less intrusive than a search. He
reasoned that if the probable cause requirement
for the warrant was satisfied, a subpoena duces
tecum would surely be justified and would with-
stand any motion to quash.89 But, this analysis
ignored the fact that the warrant and search are ex
parte, harsh, relatively unselective and unretracta-
ble once executed. The subpoena, on the other
hand, is far less intrusive because it is more limited,
giving the state the right to demand materials, but
not to ransack the premises in search of them. Also,
the subpoena may be challenged before the in-
fringement.90
Despite the questionable aspects of White's opin-
ion, certain of its conclusions may prove to be well-
founded. A special position for the media under
the fourth amendment was recognized, and "scru-
pulous exactitude" was ordered before any warrant
against them could issue.91 But the standards for
"scrupulous exactitude" were at best unclarified,
and, to the extent that they are defined, they do
not seem to provide adequate safeguards for the
first amendment interest.
Powell's deciding vote for the majority provided
greater deference to the special position of the
press, and effectively modified the stand taken by
the plurality. Powell would have required more
than the "scrupulous exactitude" ordered by the
plurality in weighing the reasonableness of a war-
rant to search a press office.92 The problem with
his opinion, and the ultimate question of the case
is, however, how much more? A comparison with
88 Id. at 1986; 353 F. Supp. at 135. For a more detailed
account and further examples of the source drying-up
phenomenon, see Note, Newsmen's Privileges Two Years
After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy, 49
TULANE L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1975).
8 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
s'See Note, Search and Seizures of the Media: A Statutory,
Fourth and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957,
981-82, 985-86, 989; contra, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1317,
1324-25 (1973).
9 1 98 S. Ct. at 1981.
w Id. at 1984 (Powell, J., concurring). See also text at
notes 50-51 supra.
Powell's concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes' may
help explain his position somewhat.
In that case, involving the right of a newsman to
refuse to testify before a grand jury concerning his
confidential sources of information, the same four
justices as in Zurcher (Burger, White, Blackmun and
Rehnquist) ruled, again in an opinion written by
White, that the first amendment does not afford
testimonial privileges for reporters called upon to
identify confidential news sources. Justice Powell
concurred for the fifth vote, but asserted that such
claims of privilege must be weighed on a case by
case basis, so that "a proper balance between free-
dom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct" would be assured.9 His preference for a
balancing test, in Zurcher and in Branzburg, was at
least consistent. But what does it specifically mean,
and what are its limits? In the two instances in
which he has recognized the special place for the
media in law enforcement matters, Powell has
found first amendment considerations insufficient
to overcome the governrfiental interest. Perhaps he
is only paying lip service to the first amendment
while actually agreeing with the plurality. Or per-
haps his special position is real, and will eventually
tip the other way to halt some state action.
Stewart's dissent presented a fairly clear and
cogent argument for the adoption of the subpoena-
first requirement in proposed media search cases.
Stewart denied creating any unwarranted excep-
tions to fourth amendment doctrine, maintaining
instead that his conclusion was the incontrovertible
result of first amendment "less drastic means" anal-
ysis.95 It is the opinion of this writer that his
findings were never effectively rebutted.
The dissent of Stevens was an attempt to return
the Court to a prior line of precedent that he
believed represented the proper interpretation of
the scope of protection required by the fourth
amendment. The Court may yet return to Stevens'
"mere evidence" rule, but his failure to gain a
single adherent indicates that such a result is
doubtful, at least for the forseeable future. His
opinion might best be read for its historical value.
CONCLUSION
In Zurcher, The Supreme Court clarified, but did
not ultimately resolve, two of the many sub-issues
in the vast area of fourth amendment search and
3 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9Id. at 710.
9* 98 S. Ct. at 1984-87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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seizure law. It can now be safely said that neither
third party status nor press status is enough to
exempt an individual from a search pursuant to
warrant. Also, the authorities are not required to
demonstrate the inefficacy of a subpoena duces
tecum before resorting to a warrant allowing search
in each of the above instances.
But beyond that, the case provides no clear
answers. Justice Powell, in his decisive opinion,
refused to allow the third party or media to be
insulated from the state's power of warrant. Yet, at
the same time, neither has been relegated to the
position of the criminal suspect. Powell instead has
chosen some undefined intermediate ground, rul-
ing that the fact that a third party or the press is
the subject of a potential search should bear on the
reasonableness of issuing a warrant. How those
factors are to come into play, and what weight
they are to carry, are questions that await answers
in further decisions of the Court.
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